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Abstract
The aim of the paper is to determine the interdependency of both balance of 
payments and fiscal deficit in the context of liberalized systems of capital flows 
with mainly stabile and appreciated exchange rate and their impact on the 
dynamics of growth of transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe with 
special retrospect to Croatia. In the research we used a classical econometric 
model for aggregated series of data of a group of transition countries, and 
individually for Croatia and Poland. We determine a significant regression 
interconnection between fiscal and balance of payments deficits for the group of 
transition countries, and individually for Croatia, with the exception of Poland 
and Eurozone. Furthermore, we explore the interdependency of these deficits with 
the growth rate of gross domestic product of analysed CEE countries and Croatia, 
where we obtain only partially significant regression results. The final conclusion 
of the analysis is the existence of significant inverse relationship of balance of 
payments and fiscal deficits of aggregates of transition economies and Croatia. 
Growth rates of gross domestic product loosely depend on the balance of payments 
deficit of groups of transition countries, which cannot be concluded for Croatia. In 
the case of relationship between the growth rate of gross domestic product with 
current budget deficits of the analyzed group of transition countries we do not 
obtain satisfactory significance. From the entire analysis we can conclude that the 
policy of reducing the balance of payments deficit with the secondary goal of 
reduction of budget deficit and a decrease in foreign debt, in present condition, has 
a pro-recessionary effect for the majority of transition countries.
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1. Introduction
Coming from the theoretical Mundell-Fleming model which links growth rate of 
gross domestic product (GDP) with the regime of exchange rate and the degree of 
capital flows liberalisation, in our conditions it is necessary to specifically examine 
the issue of limitations of monetary and fiscal policy as instruments of 
antirecessionary policy in conditions of fixed exchange rate. This is due to the fact 
that we have exogenously given both the exchange rate and current budget deficit, 
which we illustrate by a theoretical model in picture 1. That model logically depicts 
basic properties of present Croatian fiscal and monetary policy that operate in such 
given constraints that reduce their efficiency. The limitation of efficiency comes 
from the Maastricht criteria, liberalized capital account and monetary sovereignty 
of the country. We can term this phenomenon as the impossible monetary trinity. In 
such conditions the Croatian development strategy suffers too large constraints in 
order to successfully overcome long-term recession which transited into the state of 
depression of the Croatian economy in whole, for the long-term. In regards to that, 
starting hypothesis of the research is, first, fixed exchange rate regime and 
liberalized system of capital flows conditions non-sovereign monetary system 
which prevents an active anti-recessionary and development policy of the country; 
second, regression relationship between current account deficit of balance of 
payments with growth rate of GDP, on the other hand, has to show previous 
character and (im)possibility of monetary and fiscal policy in overcoming 
depression and attaining dynamic growth of transition economies of Eastern Europe 
and Croatia. Therefore, in the next part of the study we cover the following areas: 
(2) According to the Mundell-Fleming model, in present conditions, fiscal policy in 
stimulating growth is limited by the Maastricht criteria, (3) Monetary triangle and 
twin deficit, (4) Empirical and analytical test of thesis of monetary trinity and twin 
deficit of CEE countries with Turkey, including Croatia as well, (5) Is it possible to 
overcome the depression in current model of economic system of EURO zone and 
IMF?, (6) Concluding discussion on the results of the research, (7) Concluding 
remarks.
2. According to the Mundell-Fleming model, in present conditions, 
fiscal policy in stimulating growth is limited by the Maastricht 
criteria
This chapter provides a theoretical basis (Gartner, 2006) and is the starting point of 
our analysis, which assumes sufficient knowledge of real economic processes in the 
Croatian economy, particularly in regard to monetary and fiscal system and policy. 
Therefore, we do not bore the text with empirical data. In the next chapter, on the 
contrary, we empirically test the basic theoretical settings presented here, mainly by 
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using the appropriate chart of empirical data, then a regression analysis, for Croatia 
and the wider group of countries in transition.
Picture 1: Conditions of the increase of gross domestic product
Source: According to Gartner, 2006
The model thus highlights the increase in GDP, influenced by the growth of 
government spending in conditions of a fixed exchange rate, FE, and liberalized 
capital flows and interest rates. The theoretical implications of the fixed exchange 
rate and liberal capital flows, and built-in constraints, as derived from the analysis 
given in Picture 1, can be summarised as follows:
The increase in government expenditure shifts the IS curve to the right. This 
increases the GDP, which entails an increase in demand for money, which then 
increases the interest rate, i. The consequence is the further increase of attractiveness 
of government bonds and strengthening of foreign capital inflows, which again 
increases the demand for domestic currency. Since the central bank is obligated to 
meet the demand for domestic currency, which is required for the purchase of an 
increased supply of foreign currency, the LM curve also shifts to the right. At this 
point GDP0 raises to GDP1, but interest rates return to the equilibrium interest rate i0 
as well. In this process the initial equilibrium point A transits to the final new 
equilibrium point B. However, in the circumstances of given fixed exchange rate 
regime and ratio of budget deficit in GDP, as well as in terms of the Maastricht 
criteria, the process falls into a sort of budget and fixed-exchange rate limitation, or 
trap. Theoretically speaking, this refers to the Croatian case. Therefore, we cannot 
fully unwind “circular flow” as described above, so that completion of this course is 
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an increase in GDP from GDP0 to GDP1. Due to given constraints, the new 
equilibrium is established between points A and B, i.e. the “capacity” to increase 
government spending can not be fully exploited to increase GDP growth in a state 
of recession! Fixed exchange rate and the forwardly given too narrow (or zero!) 
budget deficit in relation to GDP limits the effect of depicted “circular flow” in 
terms of GDP growth. With underdeveloped institutional mechanisms in monetary 
and fiscal system to overcome these limitations, such process produces long-term 
recession, what is being observed nowadays in Croatia.
3. Monetary trinity and twin deficit
In this chapter, based on the previous analysis of the Mundell-Fleming model, we 
will first explain the schematic version of the monetary trinity where the sole 
objective of monetary policy is “stable” and fixed nominal exchange rate with fully 
liberalized capital movements. Such an objective of monetary policy and the regime 
of balance of payments capital account entails non-sovereign monetary system, 
which can not support national development goals such as full utilization of the 
economic potential and the country’s workforce. The degree of openness of foreign 
trade and capital flows in practical policy is quite different. We simplify, for 
analytical reasons, that these systems in our circumstances can be categorized as 
“liberalized”. Further on this basis we establish the existence of an inverse 
correlation of balance of payments current account deficit and current deficit of the 
general budget, or so called ‘‘twin deficits” (twin deficit, Eng.), i.e. when one 
increases the latter decreases (Zdunić, 2009:231). In other words, there should be a 
significant regression correlation, i.e. satisfactory significance of dependent 
variables with a negative coefficient for the explanatory variable. In doing so, the 
dependent variable is the state budget deficit, GVNDEF, expressed as a percentage 
of gross domestic product, GDP, and the explanatory variable is the current account 
deficit of balance of payments, CAD, expressed by a percentage of GDP. In specific 
models with these variables we add a label which denotes the country or countries 
to which the variables are related. All these issues are synthesised in Scheme 1.
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Scheme 1: Monetary trinity in conditions of fixed exchange rate and open capital 
markets – non-sovereign monetary system
A. Fixed exchange rate 
→
→
 
C.
Non-sovereign 
monetary system
 B. Open capital market 
→
↓
The Mundell-Fleming model shows that due to the fixed exchange rate there is impossibility of 
monetary expansion with the goal of increase of the GDP growth rate and that capital market 
balances the national interest rate with the global interest rate; 
↓
Since the ultimate goal of monetary policy is fixed exchange rate, in Croatian circumstances, and 
by the request set by the Maastricht criteria, the budget deficit is limited with the secondary goal of 
keeping interest rates at a given level. When it comes to the EMU countries, monetary expansion 
and, in such manner, limited fiscal expansion do not allow the so-called quantitative easing policy 
aimed at encouraging the growth rate of GDP; 
↓
The foreign exchange clauses, in Croatian situation, increase the limiting role of fixed exchange rates, 
by making monetary expansion impossible. Contradictory, in the same time they increase the risk of 
the rise of interest rates on national credit and financial markets on the basis of the interest rate parity, 
and based on the exchange rate differences and risk premiums; then, exchange rate clauses bring 
more monetary systems in a single monetary area, breaking it, i.e. parcel monetary system of Kuna 
by other currencies like the euro, Swiss franc, U.S. dollar and the like, and it makes it chaotic;
↓
However, fixed stable and appreciated exchange rate in a liberalized foreign trade and the balance 
of payments system produces the persistent current account deficits of balance of payments, by 
substituting domestic supply with imports which results in growth of gross external debt, mainly 
generated by the private sector; 
↓
Given that by the logic of the triangular proposition, or impossible trinity theorem, we have non-
sovereign monetary system in Croatia, we can pose a question on the kind of mutual dependence 
of the balance of payments deficits and fiscal deficits. For this purpose, we examine the 
characteristics of the so-called dual deficit (twin deficits), which created the illusion of tolerable 
budget deficit. This tolerance is determined by the autonomous movement of the balance of 
payment deficit in relation to the budget deficit, which is predominantly associated with stable 
fixed rates, which due to increased free and competitive imports lowers the budget deficit, i.e. 
increases the budget revenues. Thus, the fixed exchange rate and tolerable budget deficit, based on 
the free import of goods, to which domestic production could not compete, is the fundamental and 
long-term causal factor in depression of Croatia and other countries as well. 
Source: Author
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Further specificities of the exchange rate regimes in relation to the policy of 
increasing rates of GDP growth can be summarized as follows:
1) The low of the monetary triangle connects the points A, B and C in the previous 
Scheme 1 into a single geometric figure, i.e., a triangle, which shows that in the 
same direction there can lie only two vertices of the triangle. Stated by economic 
terms, this means that only two of the three monetary objectives can be mutually 
consistently achievable. Economic policy must, therefore, decide which one will be 
rejected. If monetary policy desires to achieve the goal of C, according to our 
scheme that is monetary sovereignty, which is used to achieve higher growth rates, 
then the domestic interest rate should be lower than the rate in the world market. 
This can be achieved if we restrict the outflow of the domestic and already existing 
foreign capital and increase the domestic monetary expansion. However, in policy 
of capital market liberalization domestic interest rates may be higher than the world 
ones at the beginning, which encourages the inflow of foreign capital. In that case it 
is possible to have higher market interest rates, which stemmed from open capital 
markets and fixed exchange rate, in conflict with the aim of reducing interest rates 
to stimulate the growth rate of GDP. In order to maintain the capital in these 
conditions the restrictions on its outflow have to be imposed. The points A and B 
have the same direction, i.e., fixed exchange rate and the free inflow of capital, and 
point C is outside, and thus, the goal of C, i.e. monetary sovereignty to promote 
growth can not be achieved in this combination. All three goals cannot be 
accomplished at the same time. If we want to stimulate growth we should regulate 
capital inflows and outflows and introduce the flexible exchange rate regime, in 
order to boost exports and investment and limit the substitution of domestic supply 
with imports. It is therefore necessary to have a monetary sovereignty, which allows 
an active exchange rate and interest rate policy by using appropriate monetary and 
fiscal instruments.
2) Furthermore, the theoretical solution to increase of GDP growth rate in terms of 
fixed exchange rate is fiscal expansion, as shown in Figure 1. However, our fiscal 
authority must pursue the policy of zero or limited total budgetary deficit, which 
aims to achieve a primary surplus in the amount of interests on total external debt, 
and possibly for part of the private sector debt, coupled with the arrangements of 
the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development. With the Maastricht 
criteria, in manner that they are understood and tried to accomplish in Croatia, an 
instrument of fiscal expansion can not be satisfactorily used to stimulate the growth 
of GDP. Eventually, the use of budgetary funds for investment can be on the account 
of reduction of current expenditures on social services, pensions and salaries in the 
public sector and on the charge of increasing tax revenues. This in turn means that 
the fiscal expansion as a tool to stimulate growth rates, as is shown in the next part 
of the paper, is very limited in our conditions. To summarize, this means that 
together with limited monetary we suffer limited fiscal sovereignty as well. 
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Specifically, in terms of flexible exchange rate a theoretical solution to increase the 
growth rate of GDP is the monetary expansion, which is achieved by the interest rate 
which is set lower than the rates on the global financial markets, but also by currency 
depreciation, which should induce the growth rate of GDP, i.e. exports and restrict 
imports. Our monetary authority, however, manipulates by expansion and contraction 
in order to maintain a fixed exchange rate, and thus inflation at a given level and its 
focus cannot be the rate of growth of GDP, i.e. exports and restriction of imports. The 
monetary authority has to sterilize or relax mandatory reserves in order to maintain 
the exchange rate at a certain level, and interest rate is by-product of this process. 
Thus, open market operations in a liquidity policy of the CNB as the target variable 
have only “stable” and tentatively stated fixed exchange rate. This eliminates the 
growth of GDP as a target variable, on the basis of eventual depreciation, and on the 
basis of lower interest rates on the domestic market for domestic capital.
3) Therefore, from the law of monetary triangle it follows:
Fiscal and monetary autonomy depends on the country’s exchange rate regime: a 
fixed exchange rate causes a low monetary sovereignty, and a free capital market 
undermines a fixed exchange rate regime with a tendency towards appreciation. As 
the present wider world experience shows, this is the phase process, which often 
leads to a prolonged recessionary crisis.
The Maastricht criteria, in turn, undermine fiscal sovereignty in the function of 
substitution of impaired monetary sovereignty, and this comes in the form of 
restrictions on budget deficits. The aim of budget deficit limitations in the euro zone 
is to restrict the growth of interest rates in order to reduce competition in attracting 
capital among EMU countries. In fact, in order to avoid the administrative control 
of capital movements, in fixed exchange rate regime, i.e. in conditions of a common 
currency, EMU, the restrictions on the current budget deficit are introduced, to 
prevent its impact on the rise of interest rates in some of the member states and 
which would excessively attract foreign capital. This limits fiscal sovereignty in the 
EMU countries with the primary aim that the movement of capital among the EMU 
countries is mostly determined by microeconomic criteria. The present crisis in the 
euro zone precisely confirms this hypothesis. The principles of the movement of 
capital associated with stable exchange rates and the policy of budget deficits, but 
“loose” restrictions on the balance of payments deficit, results in contradictory 
effects in CEE countries, especially in Croatia.
Setup of different combinations of these constraints determine the varying degrees 
of denial of the economic sovereignty of the country: sturdy and low current budget 
deficit, combined with fixed exchange rates and liberal system of international 
capital movements result in a high degree of non-sovereignty of the economic 
system of a country and limit the policy of maximizing the growth rate of GDP and 
employment, i.e. policy of economic recovery from a state of recession.
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4. Empirical and analytical test of thesis of monetary triangle and 
twin deficit of CEE countries and Turkey
Statistically speaking, the lower regression correlation of the current budget deficit 
and balance of payments deficit, the higher a degree in which economic policy of the 
country follows their own goals: intentional, accidental or coerced, particularly in 
terms of maximizing the growth rate of GDP and employment. Then, it means that it 
can enjoy greater monetary and fiscal autonomy, which can be practiced in policy of 
development. Otherwise, the goal of integration into the global economic system 
dominates, which is reflected in the regression relationship between two deficits with 
respect to the coefficient of the independent variable, CAD, which can have a positive 
or a negative sign. Our analysis shows that a lower budget deficit, stable and 
appreciating exchange rate and liberalized capital and commodities market implies a 
larger balance of payment deficit, as a result of lower level of monetary and fiscal 
autonomy. This case is present in Croatia, but also increasingly in other countries with 
fixed and appreciating exchange rates. Thus, further in text, we explore the 
relationship of the current budget deficits and balance of payments, the so-called twin 
deficits, for the following countries: Croatia, CRO, Poland, POL, Central and Eastern 
European countries, CEE, with Turkey, both individually and in groups. In the 
aggregate of CEE countries we included Croatia and Poland, and for analytical 
reasons, these are isolated and analysed individually. Therefore, in below we present, 
first, graphic images of movement in nominal exchange rates of selected countries in 
the CEE group in order to show that the starting point of their exchange rate policy 
follows the logic of monetary triangle. We present only some individual countries, 
because the exchange rates in this case can not be aggregated in a single indicator. 
After that we try to determine the regression “regularities” of budget deficit and the 
current account deficit of balance of payment, the so-called double or twin deficit. 
Finally, instead of statistical reports, we will present the graphic images of series of 
the budget deficit, GVN-DEF, and the current account deficit of balance of payments, 
CAD, in the form of raw data, separately for Croatia and Poland and the CEE group 
as a whole. For the purposes of illustration, we will add some individual countries and 
the EMU group as a whole. In this way we present the impression of these empirical 
relationships, and better understand the intuitive meaning of regression equations and 
the credibility of their parameters. This credibility will convince us that these are 
patterns of today’s European economic system in the aspect of relationship of the 
European system with transition countries of Eastern Europe, together with Turkey. 
Data for this analysis were taken from the IMF statistics, which are published as a 
supplement to the projections of the publication World Economic Outlook every half 
year. From descriptions of charts and tables it can be observed on which country data, 
regressions and charts refer. It should be noted that aggregates for CEE countries with 
Turkey include: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, 
Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, 
Serbia and Turkey. The corresponding variables are in some way weighted aggregates 
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(mainly shares in the total GDP) of that entire group. Of course, there are significant 
deviations of the individual country variables from aggregate group variables. It is 
important to have in mind that the data series for GVNDEF and the CAD are released 
for the period 2001 – 2015, where for the period from year 2001 to 2008 these are 
actual data and from 2008 to 2015 projected data, i.e. evaluated by a certain 
procedure. As the chart shows, for the exchange rates we take the actual figures for 
the corresponding period. An interesting detail of this procedure is that such procedure 
reveals “the system assumptions” for the future of the analyzed countries. Thus, our 
analysis, based on these series, reveals that the IMF accounts with the same system 
assumptions that were valid up to year 2008 in the future, as well, namely: stable 
mildly appreciating exchange rate; the dependence of the budget deficit on the balance 
of payments current account deficit; and in conditions of crisis and recession the focus 
is on administrative intervention in reducing budget deficits, i.e., of the total 
consumption. But the models of liberalized capital flows and liberalized foreign trade 
system in the policy of neutralizing the balance of payments deficit will remain 
untouchable mechanisms, i.e. they are exogenously given. The main instrument of 
balancing is, therefore, “spending cuts”. This means that there is no reliance on the 
monetary and exchange rate policy or quantitative easing policy as instruments for 
neutralizing the balance of payment deficits. Interestingly, such policy is not forbiden 
in the official recommendations of the IMF, even in the Croatian case. The results of 
our analysis are very interesting from the viewpoint of general systems vision in 
building the economic system of the selected countries and the consistency of that 
vision with the vision, which is evident in the projections of the IMF. Nevertheless, 
the fundamental vision is based on the monetary triangle which imposes present 
implications.
4.1. The goal of exchange rate policy of the most of CEE countries in the 
previous period was stable nominal exchange rate with fluctuations in 
lesser extent
Figure 1 shows that all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are 
included in this group, from the January of 2001 to the May of 2011, conduct 
(according to the projection they will continue in the future!!!) a clear policy of stable, 
appreciating, and only exceptionally, as in the case of Turkey since year 2005, of 
depreciating exchange rate. For some countries we do not have individual data on 
indices of the exchange rates in that period, and therefore they are not presented 
(Serbia, Albania, while the BiH has currency board system!). However, this does not 
affect the overall picture of stable exchange rate policies of these countries. The crisis 
in year 2008 in some countries, however, has exerted depreciating reaction of their 
monetary authorities (Hungary, Poland, Turkey). However, already from year 2010/11 
the stable exchange rates policy returns in these countries, or at least this is assumed 
by the IMF experts. Since the main purpose of our analysis is to determine the 
interdependence of the current budget deficits and the balance of payments deficits, 
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we consider that this general impression of movement in exchange rates, which 
satisfies the basic assumption of stable and pegged exchange rates, as the basis of 
restrictive monetary sovereignty, is sufficient. The existing deviations from the general 
rule actually confirm the significance of such an assumption. We present this analysis 
in the form of graphs, which are given in two sub-graphs for the purposes of clarity.
Figure 1: Indices of nominal exchange rates of CEE countries and Turkey for the 
period 2001 – 2011, Base 2001m01 = 100
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Note: ERIND denotes the index of the nominal exchange rate with the specified database on a 
monthly basis. Letters in front denote the country for which the index relates.
Source: Authors calculation
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A more realistic picture of diverse and targeted exchange rate policies is given in 
Figure 2, which displays the indices of real exchange rates, weighted by ERDI. We 
include only some characteristic countries: Czech Republic, Poland, Croatia, 
Sweden, Hungary, Great Britain, and Germany as a benchmark; we use annual data 
series, and the base year is 2000 = 100. Selected countries provide excellent 
illustration of the response to the shock of the crisis for both developed and 
transition countries.
Figure 2: ERDI adjusted exchange rates of comparable transition and other 
countries
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Note: For the analytical meaningfulness and the definitions of indices presented here compare 
Radosevic (2010); specificity of the Croatian monetary policy; the definition and meaning 
of ERDI, as the ratio of the current nominal exchange rate and the exchange rate based on 
purchasing power of national currency (Zdunic, 2004, Jurcic Vojnić, 2010)
Source: Authors calculation
Here we use real exchange rates based on indices of national price index and price 
index of Germany as a foreign prices taken equally for all of the countries. The 
common name for such an index is APR to which we add abbreviated name of the 
relevant country and currency, such as the Czech Republic, APR_CZK1, United 
Kingdom, APR_UKP1, Croatia, APR_HRK1, and other similar self-evident labels. 
The figure clearly shows that all of the countries, except Germany and Croatia, 
responded to the recession “shock” by exchange rate policy. This is understandable, 
given that the HRK, Croatian kuna, is tightly pegged to the euro. Germany 
continues with slow appreciation trend, which corresponds to the annual inflation 
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rate, apparently relying on a steady growth in the productivity of its economy. 
Polish case, however, is particularly interesting because it indicates depreciation 
from the EURO and Croatian kuna for the entire period from 2000 to 2010. We 
find interesting the exchange rate policies of Great Britain and Sweden, as 
developed countries, which during the shock of crisis very explicitly used the 
exchange rate policy as a means of enhancing the competitiveness of their 
economies. Similar approach took Hungary, which obviously overestimated their 
competitiveness by relying on productivity growth in the period prior to the crisis, 
and quickly responds by the exchange rate depreciation during the crisis. We find 
that the Czech Republic has a very “calm” response and in principle remains on 
the route of the long-term and gradual appreciation of its currency. However, the 
index of the Czech Republic clearly shows that in the beginning there was a high 
real depreciation, which has provided support for business competitiveness in the 
long period. Thus, their currency did not have real appreciation in relation to 
Croatian Kuna before to the year 2005. Figure 2 complements Figure 1 by making 
the index of nominal exchange rates more relative. By such an approach we 
obtain, at least for some countries, more informative picture of the real goals of 
their exchange policies. It is important to note, however, that Croatia follows a 
policy which does not match to its productivity, which is equally presented by 
weighted and nominal indices.
4.2. Aggregate and individual econometric models of dual deficit of the CEE 
countries
Our basic assumption is that the group of CEE countries, which typically have 
stable and appreciating exchange rates and liberalized flows of capital and goods 
show certain common forms of relationship of current budget deficits and deficits 
of current account of balance of payments. The theory of such relations was created 
in the USA in the period from 1970 to 1986, when there were presented 
econometrically measured authentic relationships of movement between the two 
deficits. This was the time when “Twin deficits” theory was formed. After that 
period the movements in the USA are divergent. However, the thesis that higher 
budget deficit implies higher deficit of current account of balance of payments 
remained valid coupled with the question on the meaning of that relationship. We 
were interested to see whether this theory applies in the transition countries, 
whether its authenticity can be econometrically confirmed and what kind of 
econometric model can be applied. For this purpose, we formed a special equation 
for the group of CEE countries along with Turkey, and a special equation for Poland 
and Croatia, which are, normally, contained in the aggregate of CEE countries. 
Dependent variable, GVNDEF, for the whole group of CEE countries indicates an 
the average of current government budget deficits. Similarly, variable CAD denotes 
average of deficits of current account of balance of payments of these countries. 
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Analogous variables for Poland and Croatia are GVDEF and CAD. Tables 1, 2 and 
3 show the model results. Sources of data series are set out ahead in the beginning 
of this chapter. It should be noted that in some models, as well as graphs of 
empirical data, some series start in different years. This is due to data availability in 
the series of International Monetary Fund (2011). We have not added data from 
other sources in order not to affect the principle of uniformity that might produce a 
certain “bias” in the analysis.
Table 1: Regression evaluation of interdependence of the current government 
budget deficit and current account deficit of balance of payments of the 
CEE countries and Turkey
Dependent Variable: GVNDEF_CEE
Method: Least Squares
Date: 01/06/11 Time: 18:31
Sample (adjusted): 2002 2015
Included observations: 14 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CAD_CEE -0.806434 0.227298 -3.547917 0.0040
C -7.844217 1.165559 -6.730006 0.0000
R-squared 0.511951 Mean dependent var -3.908071
Adjusted R-squared 0.471281 S.D. dependent var 1.838886
S.E. of regression 1.337111 Akaike info criterion 3.550463
Sum squared resid 21.45439 Schwarz criterion 3.641757
Log likelihood -22.85324 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.542012
F-statistic 12.58772 Durbin-Watson stat 0.707255
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004012
Source: Authors calculation
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Table 2: Regression evaluation of interdependence of the current government budget 
deficit and current account deficit of balance of payments of Croatia
Dependent Variable: GVDEF_HRV
Method: Least Squares
Date: 01/06/11 Time: 18:33
Sample (adjusted): 2002 2015
Included observations: 14 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CAD_HRV -0.676677 0.135425 -4.996683 0.0003
C -7.211729 0.824321 -8.748685 0.0000
R-squared 0.675385 Mean dependent var -3.201357
Adjusted R-squared 0.648333 S.D. dependent var 1.185928
S.E. of regression 0.703273 Akaike info criterion 2.265421
Sum squared resid 5.935116 Schwarz criterion 2.356715
Log likelihood -13.85794 Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.256970
F-statistic 24.96684 Durbin-Watson stat 0.864668
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000311
Source: Authors calculation
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Table 3: Regression evaluation of interdependence of the current government 
budget deficit and current account deficit of balance of payments of Poland
Dependent Variable: GVDEF_POL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 01/06/11 Time: 18:33
Sample: 1995 2015
Included observations: 21
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CAD_POL -0.445943 0.162974 -2.736274 0.0131
C -6.100951 0.581402 -10.49352 0.0000
R-squared 0.282672  Mean dependent var -4.695190
Adjusted R-squared 0.244918  S.D. dependent var 1.435454
S.E. of regression 1.247344  Akaike info criterion 3.370303
Sum squared resid 29.56148  Schwarz criterion 3.469781
Log likelihood -33.38818  Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.391892
F-statistic 7.487195  Durbin-Watson stat 0.788877
Prob(F-statistic) 0.013119
Note  to Tables 1, 2 and 3: In all of three models t-statistics is satisfactory; the level of 
significance of parameters of the equation, including the constant C, are very acceptible; 
the hypothesis of the existence of autocorrelation residue was rejected on the significance 
levels of 1 and 5 percent (not presented here); the test was conducted, as usual, due to low 
DW statistics. R-square as a measure of fitness, i.e.,”scatterness” of the data in the 
evaluated equations are quite different, and the best are for the Croatian model. Group CEE 
model shows higher “dispersion” of data around the calculated regression line than the 
Croatian one; the greatest dispersion can be observed in case of Poland.
Source: Authors calculation
Coefficients of the explanatory variable CAD clearly show that the reduction of 
budget deficits, GVNDEF and GVDEF, base on increase of the balance of payments 
deficit, CAD. The “twin deficits” theory is, therefore, valid, but in a “perverse” 
form: decrease of the budget deficit is sustained by the growth of balance of 
payments deficit, as a negative size. Deficit of the balance of payments is, on the 
other hand, supported by appreciated fixed exchange rate and liberalized trade and 
balance of payments systems. Therefore, in the current conditions, the policy of 
reduction of budget deficit was successful to then extent in which the policy of 
reduction of the balance of payments deficit was unsuccessful. This policy was a 
success as much as the policy of fixed exchange rate and monetary restrictions was 
unsuccessful. Thus, the law of the triangle in the group of CEE countries and 
Turkey, taking them collectively, confirmed its significance: a fixed exchange rate 
and the liberalization of capital flows and goods abolished the monetary sovereignty. 
The consequence is that monetary policy can not support national development 
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goals in terms of GDP growth and employment or can not support the reduction of 
current account deficit of the balance of payments and gross external debt as well. 
The same notion applies individually for Croatia and Poland. However, this is least 
valid for Poland, which is evident by the lowest coefficient of the variable CAD!
4.3. Empirical picture of the interdependence of the series GVNDEF and series 
CAD of CEE countries and Turkey, and especially Croatian, Polish, and 
the Euro zone
In the text below we present a raw data series GVNDEF, CAD, GVDEF for the 
groups of countries and individual countries in graphical form. This is necessary in 
order to grasp an intuitive idea of the relationships that we have previously 
evaluated by regression. Dynamics of the raw data series clearly shows the opposite 
trends in budgetary and balance of payment deficits. This is especially visible for 
the CEE group of countries and Croatia. Poland shows much less regularities in the 
movement of its deficits, which was demonstrated in the regression equation as 
well. It is interesting to recall that the data from 2008 and further are evaluated, i.e., 
projected. Up to that year these are actual data, developed and assessed in the IMF’s 
WEO Dataset. The importance of this lies in the fact that this shows the IMF’s 
notion that the system in which this effect operates is permanent, even in Poland. It 
is important to mention Poland, and probably some other countries from the group 
for which we do not have a complete information and series, because this country 
shows the highest degree of autonomy in its monetary and exchange rate policy. If 
that is the case, then there is some space to assume that, in the period that we 
observe, countries with greater monetary and exchange rate autonomy should show 
a more significant relationship between the growth rates of real GDP and the budget 
deficit, and weaker link of the growth rate of GDP with the balance of payments 
deficit. For dependent countries this should be the opposite, i.e. they should show a 
stronger relationship with the growth rate of GDP and the balance of payments deficit. 
Thus, we try to examine this in the next chapter with the title Is it possible to overcome 
depression in the current model of economic system of the EU and the IMF. 
Figures 3 and 4 presented below clearly show: if deficit of the balance of payments 
is higher, the lower is the government budget deficit. This obvious relation has a 
very simple explanation based on the foreign trade system and the tax revenue 
derived from it, which by their nature cover part of the budget deficit by reducing it. 
This has been previously observed by our economists and appropriately interpreted 
(Santini, 2011). Our regression analysis shows, however, that this is a phenomenon 
that has wider systematic ranking for most of the transition countries with serious 
structural implications for their economies, which will not be discussed here. It is 
worth to mention, that Poland clearly stands out from the “dependent” group of 
transition countries, although we obtained valid regression equation. However, the 
“intensity” of that relationship in Poland is considerably smaller, as is shown in 
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Table 3. In addition, it is evident in the figures that data series for the budgets of 
CEE countries and Croatia is much shorter, while in the case of Poland series of 
budgetary and balance of payments deficit are “filled” for the whole period. 
Together with the interdependency of budgetary and balance of payments deficit it 
is apparent that there must exist positive relation of growth of gross government 
debt and these deficits, but we do not deal with this issue here. 
Figure 3: Balance of payments and government budget deficit of Croatia 
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Figure 4: Balance of payments and government budget deficit of the CEE countries
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Figure 5: Balance of payments and government budget deficit of Poland 
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5. Is it possible to overcome depression in the current model of 
economic system of the EU and the IMF?
Based on the statistical series composed on, partly observed data, and partly 
projected data from the statistical annex of the World Economic Outlook, as 
described before, we attempted to evaluate the relationship between the growth rate 
of GDP as dependent variable and the budget deficits and the current account of the 
balance of payments deficit of the countries analyzed. Increased dependence of the 
growth rate of GDP on the budget deficit should show greater autonomy in setting 
the rate of growth of GDP as a target variable of economic policy. On the other 
hand, greater dependence on the deficit of current account of the balance of 
payments shows increased growth dependence on foreign capital (liberal 
approach!). Dependence on these deficits measured by coefficient of the explanatory 
variable can have a positive or negative sign, thus, one should be cautious in its 
interpretation: given that the growth rate of GDP (real!) is positive value, while the 
budget deficit and current account of balance of payments show negative 
percentages in relation to GDP, this means that reducing the budget deficit, i.e., 
reducing its “depth” , if at the same time, there is an increase of the real rate of GDP 
growth, confirming the modern theory, which prevails in the euro area, the budget 
deficits should be reduced in order to come out from economic recession. Basis of 
this thesis is the impact of current deficits on interest rates, which is the motive for 
limitations ensuing from the Maastricht criteria. The question is whether this rule 
applies to the transition economies!
On the other hand, the question arises, whether the balance of payments deficit, 
expressed by the negative percentage to GDP, is positively or negatively correlated 
with the real GDP growth rate i.e., does the balance of payments deficit increases or 
decreases real GDP growth rate? Then, the question is whether these relationships 
are identical in the Euro zone countries and countries in transition.
For this purpose, we tried to evaluate the regression models in a way that the real 
growth rate of GDP, denoted by PCGDP- as the dependent variable, depends on the 
independent variables GVNDEF or GVDEF and CAD for group of countries or 
individual countries that we analyse. Here we present only the results of evaluation 
that are acceptable from the econometrics point of view, namely:
•  PCGDP-EURO area depends on GVNDEF-EURO area with a coefficient value 
of 0.53814 and significance of 0.47 percent; even the constant is significant at 0.0 
level;
•  PCGDP-POL depends on GVDEF-POL with a coefficient value of 0.57167 and 
significance of 2.35 percent; constant is significant at 0.0 percent level;
•  PCGDP-CEE depends on the CAD-CEE with a coefficient value of 0.30713 and 
significance of 10.54 percent; constant is significant at 25.10 percent level;
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Based on these results, only the first two econometric models are acceptable, while 
the third model in accordance with the strict criteria is unacceptable. All other tested 
variants do not meet the basic criterion of acceptability, which means:
•  Croatian growth rate of GDP can not be correlated with neither the budget nor 
the balance of payments deficit; in other words, the growth rate of GDP was not 
the target neither to the monetary and exchange rate policy nor to the fiscal 
policy; what appeared to be the anti-recessionary policy was merely adjustment 
to the available GDP; there was no any relevant macroeconomic policy from the 
domain of Croatian national bank (CNB) or government directed on the growth 
of GDP; this refers to the whole period of analysis; 
•  On the contrary, euro area and Poland have implemented restrictive fiscal policy, 
which gave a higher rate of growth of GDP, i.e. the lower was the budget deficit 
both in the long-run, and in times of crisis, the growth rate was higher; in the 
case of Poland with a lot of confidence we argue that the reason for such state is 
in the active exchange rate policy, as we have previously noted; in regards to the 
EURO area we can list some other reasons that we can not analyze inhere, but we 
can assume that the important role had a consistent fiscal anti-cyclical policy 
which is not evident on the level of annual data (Švaljek et al., 2009); the period 
of crisis shows that there are quite divergent policies in the euro zone in respect 
to this issue;
•  The last important question, on which it is necessary to provide an answer, is the 
relation between the deficit of current account of the balance of payments with the 
rate of GDP growth: in the case of Poland and the Euro-zone this relation does not 
exist, while in the CEE countries, it is present to “some extent”, which can be 
econometrically only partially taken into account, as it can be seen below; the 
conclusion in this regard is clear: foreign capital has been mainly supporting 
consumption, privatization processes, i.e. it was directed to the “non-tradable 
sector”, and “inflated “balloons; for such state of affairs Croatia is the best example.
•  The projections of the simulation, based on projected data of the World Economic 
Outlook - International Monetary Funds, supposed the same relationships among 
the variables as in present period, while in supposed countries CAD “calms” at a 
considerable depth of about 4 percent of GDP; Growth rate still seems dependent 
on this deficit and, therefore, deeper deficit means a higher growth rate.
In order to bring these results closer to our intuitive understanding we simulate the 
model solutions for those cases that are econometrically correct, with the exception 
of the CEE countries for which we take the best model (and not insist on the 
rigorous econometric criteria). Simulations are presented by figures 6, 7 and 8.
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Figure 6: Current account deficits and real growth rate in the Euroarea
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Figure 7: Government budget deficits and real growth rate in Poland
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Figure 8: Current account deficits and real growth rate in the CEE countries
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Figures are self-evident, and it is not necessary to further interpret them after 
previous analysis. Each figure is presented by two “Baseline” sub-figures in order 
to be able to directly compare the dynamics of the variables, i.e. to observe 
dependence of their direction trends.
6. Final discussion on the results of the research 
Analysis of the interconnectedness of the budgetary and balance of payments deficit 
proved to be meaningful. Likewise, the meaning of relationship between these 
deficits with stable nominal exchange rates with liberalised systems of capital flows 
is very much worth of attention! This is in particular, because a regression 
relationship between these two deficits has a negative sign! We have to alert to the 
very depth of this deficit! Clear tendency and the recommendations of international 
financial institutions is that the intervention has to focus on reduction of the budget 
deficit which is related with the goal of reduction of the balance of payments deficit, 
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i.e. these are attempts to overcome its abandonment to the “market spontaneity” of 
the private sector. It will be interesting to see what role in this regulation shall have 
the supervision of banks, and which the exchange rate and interest rates or monetary 
policy instruments. Croatia, for example, with its administrative intervention by 
monetary authorities (Kokenyne, 2010), but with the policy of budget deficit 
reduction too, as is well known, is quite unsuccessful. The cause of generally 
uncontrolled growth of the current account of the balance of payment deficits may 
be, as in the Croatian case, only the policy of stable exchange rates of national 
currencies and liberalized system of capital flows, as the figures and Scheme 1 
illustrates. Based on current recommendations of the G20 countries and the 
European Commission, we can expect regulation of the banking system in the EU, 
for the purposes of neutralizing balance of payment deficits. That would be a 
regulation at the microeconomic level, as a complement to macroeconomic 
regulation in the spirit of the “Maastricht”! Therefore, we should not expect 
regulation from the position of the national economy “model”, i.e. the position of 
“keynesianism”? The implications of this will be substantial for the future 
configuration of Europe!
The derived results ensuing from the whole analysis, and based on published 
standings of EBRD and the IMF, can be summarized as follows: In the strategy of 
overcoming the recession on the equilibrium path of stable development with the goal 
of full employment, transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe should rely on 
borrowing in local national currencies, which means they need to develop national 
capital markets. In the analysis of the EBRD, it is stated that the current degree of 
integration of financial and banking markets of transition and western countries gave 
positive results, but the exit from the current crisis requires a new strategy and goals 
of building the financial system and coordinated regulation of the corresponding 
authorities of these countries and European institutions. A positive example in this 
direction is so-called “Vienna” initiative, which provided support from parent banks 
to their subsidiaries in transition economies. It also helped to avoid a catastrophic 
recession and the collapse of economic systems of these countries (EBRD, 2010). But 
in the same time transition countries have to stop with the current policies of excessive 
borrowing in foreign currencies, strengthened by exchange-rate clauses and stable 
fixed rates of national currencies. Exchange rate policy has oriented investment by 
foreign and domestic capital to non-exporting sectors of the economy, undermining 
external liquidity. There has to be a shift towards development of sovereign monetary 
systems, in which the exchange rate is an important absorber of external shocks, and 
to turn to their own sources of savings. This does not mean a policy of disintegration 
of created single financial market and the system of transition and European countries, 
but its strengthening and development of his sound fundamentals. Only on this basis, 
we argue, the accession to the monetary union is acceptable.
For this discussion, however, it is necessary to elaborate possibilities for overcoming 
the Croatian economic and monetary problems. Croatia desperately needs a strategy 
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of exit from the recession and setting grounds of further development. This strategy 
involves restoring the sovereignty of Croatian monetary system. Such a strategy 
would also get the external support (e.g. EBRD). The restructuring of our strategy is 
necessary. The current situation, which is the product of the current monetary policy, 
prevents any meaningful structural development strategy, as well as, any meaningful 
anti-recession policy. Interest rate parities should be based on the stability of sovereign 
financial systems and markets, similar as in developed countries, rather than the 
banking oligopolies, which prevent meaningful monetary policy, justifying 
themselves by the exchange rate and inflation risks. Application of foreign currency 
clause on all debtor-creditor relations, in foreign currency or kuna, is actually a result 
of the failure of our monetary policy in the last decade and a half. In this regard, it is 
important to emphasize that our monetary authorities never called for a strategy of 
“de-dollarization” (or “de-euroisation”) of our monetary and banking system 
(Radosevic, 2010) which is now required by the ERBD! Developmental implications 
of the absence of such policies are particularly evident in the formation of inadequate 
export un-oriented economic structure (IMF, 2010) and that means via facto inability 
to adjust exchange rate, interest rates and fiscal deficits to development needs.
7. Concluding remarks
The results of the analysis provide confirmation of the initial research hypotheses of 
the study. This means, first, that fiscal and monetary autonomy depends on exchange 
rate regime of the country: a fixed exchange rate causes a low monetary sovereignty, 
and free capital markets undermine a fixed exchange rate regime; “Maastricht 
criteria” undermine fiscal sovereignty which can not compensate for the weakened 
monetary sovereignty; this is realized in the form of restrictions on the budget deficit 
in order to prevent the rise in interest rates. In this way, terms of competitiveness in 
attracting the capital equate in the EU countries. In order to avoid capital controls in 
fixed exchange rate regime, restrictions on the current budget deficit have to be 
introduced, which indirectly regulates interest rates. In terms of integration of 
transition countries into the European Economic Area relationship of two deficits can 
have a positive or negative sign. However, a lower budget deficit, appreciating stable 
exchange rate and liberalized market of capital and commodities implies a larger 
balance of payments deficit and a lower level of monetary and fiscal autonomy. 
Empirical verification confirmed the validity of such judgment. 
Second, outlined framework of the global economic model that would allow a 
selection of national economic model, monetary and fiscal sovereignty, and the 
achievement of national development goals: a more complete utilization of national 
resources and workforce, together with the recovery from recession. This policy 
does not have to be in conflict with the policy of integration into the European 
economic system. The strategy in this regard has always been possible, and today it 
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is desirable, as evidenced by the support of leading institutions that everyone finds 
their own solution out of the crisis! 
It is emphasized also that the results of the analysis are not in conflict with those of 
international financial institutions, notably the EBRD and the IMF. 
In the Croatian situation, by the new strategy, it is necessary to identify certain real 
version of recovery from recession and of further development. The strategy would, 
in accordance with the principles of “new” European policies, come from 
restoration of sovereignty of the monetary system. It would enable the policy of 
setting the parameters of the exchange rate and the abandonment of currency 
clauses. Also, it would provide fiscal autonomy in function of anti-recessionary and 
development policy. However, such a strategy would also demand necessary 
reprogramming and adequate credit support.
The warnings about the necessity of changing the current understanding of the 
“path” towards the EU, which was based on a passive strategy of adaptation, i.e. 
“recovery” with even greater flow of foreign financing and the growth of external 
debt should, therefore, be taken seriously! This thesis is especially popular in 
Croatia. This was not affected by the ECB or by the EU institutions by their 
regulation, and now in this respect, the attitudes are changing. A coordinated 
regulation of the European institutions and countries in transition is required. For 
this policy the Croatian authorities need to determine - on the basis of the new 
politics of European integration – a special strategy, which would surpass their 
previous “technical” level of approach to politics of recovery from recession. 
Furthermore, this demands a systematic approach, in the form institutional 
upgrading and restoration of sovereignty of monetary and financial system with the 
goal of effective integration into the EU!
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Od nemogućega monetarnoga trokuta do ekonomske depresije
Stjepan Zdunić1
Sažetak
Cilj rada je istražiti međuovisnost platno bilančnoga i fiskalnoga deficita u 
kontekstu libelariziranoga sustava tokova kapitala s pretežno stabilnim i 
aprecirajućim valutnim tečajem, te utjecaj toga na dinamiku rasta gospodarstava 
tranzicijskih zemalja Centralne i Istočne Europe s posebnim osvrtom na Hrvatsku. 
U istraživanju su korišteni klasični ekonometrijski modeli za agregirane serije 
podataka skupine tranzicijskih zemalja, te pojedinačno za Hrvatsku i Poljsku. 
Utvrđene su signifikantne regresijske povezanosti fiskalnih i platnobilančnih 
deficita za tranzicijske zemlje skupno, te i pojedinačno za Hrvatsku, sa izuzetkom 
Poljske i euro zone. Zatim je istražena povezanost tih deficita sa stopama rasta 
bruto domaćih proizvoda pojedinih kategorija zemalja i Hrvatske, u čemu su 
rezultati regresijske analize tek djelomično signifikantni. Konačan zaključak 
analize jest postojanje vjerodostojne inverzne povezanosti platno bilančnih deficita 
sa proračunskim deficitima agregata tranzicijskih zemalja i Hrvatske pojedinačno, 
a stope rasta bruto domaćega proizvoda labavo ovise o platnobilančnom deficitu 
agregata tranzicijskih zemalja, dok se za Hrvatsku to ne može zaključiti. Za 
povezanost stope rasta bruto domaćega proizvoda sa tekućim deficitima proračuna 
analizirane skupine tranzicijskih zemalja nije se utvrdila zadovoljavajuća 
vjerodostojnost. Iz cjeline analize se zaključuje, da je politika smanjenja 
platnobilančnoga deficita s podciljem smanjenja proračunskoga deficita i 
smanjenja vanjskoga duga, u današnjim okolnostima, prorecesijskoga značaja za 
većinu tranzicijskih zemalja. 
Ključne riječi: dvojni deficit, monetarni trokut, ekonometrijski model, fiksni tečaj, 
devizna klauzula, liberalizirano financijsko tržište, depresija 
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